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DETECTING EVASIVE MALICIOUS URL USING GRAPH ALGORITHM
Introduction
The present disclosure provides systems and methods to enable inspecting of byte
streams using a bipartite match algorithm to detect the use of evasive techniques to defeat
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) filtering or filtering of other Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URI). Generally, URL filtering is one of the primary methods used to detect cyber threats.
However, the URL specification (e.g., as set forth in RFC 3986) is quite flexible and can allow
malicious actors to use evasive techniques to defeat algorithms used in URL filtering
technologies. The conventional way to inspect byte streams, in particular for web traffic, often
uses automata (e.g., Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA), Nondeterministic Finite Automaton
(NFA)) or regular expression (regex)). These methods generally work well when the regex is
relatively "simple," but when evasive techniques are used, automata is less effective. The
systems and methods of the present disclosure can provide for inspecting byte streams using a
bipartite match algorithm. Effectively, the token can be kept simple, and the complexity of the
pattern (formed using the token) can be expressed using bipartite match terminology.
Summary
According to an aspect of the present disclosure, a two stage dynamic programming
algorithm is provided to enable inspecting of byte streams to detect use of evasive techniques to
defeat Uniform Resource (URL) filtering. This algorithm matches signatures once and only once
just like DFA in the first stage, and uses polynomial runtime to select a matching pattern in the
second stage.
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Detailed Description
The systems and methods of the present disclosure can provide for inspecting byte
streams using a bipartite match algorithm. According to an aspect of the present disclosure, the
token can be kept simple, and the complexity of the pattern (formed using the token) can be
expressed using bipartite match terminology. The pattern is a sequence of tokens. (Note that a
token can match to multiple signatures.)
The tokens in the pattern are adjacent and their order of appearance is significant, these
two factors are implicitly inconvenient for describing collections of signatures where order or
continuity (e.g., a pattern “abc” where a, b, and c are tokens and there are no other tokens in the
pattern) or both are not the matching criteria. The above can be difficult and/or expensive to
execute, even not possible, in DFA, as well as NFA when compounded with signature
polymorphism. From the first principle, this is a combinatorial pattern matching problem.
According to an aspect of the present disclosure, a two stage dynamic programming
algorithm and related data structure is provided as an alternative to DFA. This algorithm
matches signatures once and only once just like DFA in the first stage, and uses polynomial
runtime to select a matching pattern in the second stage.
According to an example implementation of the present disclosure, a two stage dynamic
programming algorithm comprises the following operations. Conceptually, in compile time, the
patterns are compiled into an n*m binary matrix plus one additional column to describe the
modifiers, where n is the number of patterns and m is the number of unique tokens used in the
patterns. The tokens are compiled into DFA as usual (e.g., partitioned per URL host + path
using a trie data structure) such that e(i,j)=1 if and only if the ith pattern has the jth token. In the
first stage of runtime, first an n*m binary matrix is built where n is the number of tokens
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matched against the DFA (e.g., tokens are obtained from protocol/URL parsing phase) and m is
the number of tokens such that e(i,j)=true if and only if the ith token matches the jth token. Note
that the ith row can have multiple columns set to true. In the second stage of runtime, the sub
runtime n*m matrix is obtained for a particular pattern such that e(i,j)=true if and only if the ith
token matches the jth tokens in the pattern. A bipartite graph is equivalent to a matrix, therefore,
a bipartite graph can be built where there are two sets of vertex, n and m, where n is token and m
is signature. There is a weight 1 edge between an ith vertex in n and an nth vertex in m if e(i,j) in
the matrix is true.
The necessary condition for a pattern match is the bipartite graph's maximum bipartite
matching or max flow equals to m, the number of tokens in the pattern. This can be proven using
the definition of maximum bipartite matching/max flow, which will be called Raven Pattern
Matching Theorem L herein. It can be further proven that Theorem L is not only the necessary
but also the sufficient condition for patterns who have both orderfree and continuityfree
modifiers.
When patterns have only the orderfree modifier, there is a need to additionally check that
it is continuous max flow. The FordFulkerson algorithm (FFA) and its variants can be used to
determine the max flow number in O(Ef).
Function FFA
for each edge (u,v) in E(G)
do f[u, v] = 0 f[v, u] = 0 while there is a path p from s to t in the residual network Gf
do m = min{c(u, v)-f[u, v]: (u, v) is on p} for each edge (u, v) on p
do f[u, v] = f[u, v] + m f[v, u] = - f[u, v]
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FFA can be overkill since it deals with general graphs, whereas the HopcroftKarp
algorithm (HKA) is an example of a max flow algorithm for bipartite graphs. It runs in
O(E*sqrt(V)), and for random graphs, it runs in near linear time. For sparse graphs, HKA can
provide better results in worst case performance.
Function HKA
for each u in U
Pair_U[u] = NIL for each v in V
Pair_V[v] = NIL matching = 0 while BFS() == true
for each u in U
if Pair_U[u] == NIL
if DFS(u) == true
matching = matching + 1
return matching
It can be proven that if and only if the diagonals of the sub square m*m matrix are all
true, then it matches a pattern who has neither orderfree nor continuityfree. A naive algorithm
can determine the above in O(nm). A KnuthMorrisPratt style algorithm can be used to speed this
up.
Finally, it can be proven that the runtime is O(n) for patterns that have only
continuityfree.
All four combinations of orderfree and continuityfree therefore have polynomial runtime
complexity or better.
In conclusion, just like DFA is the mathematical model for regex, bipartite graph is a
good mathematical model to represent pattern.
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For combinatorial analysis, the problem space is roughly P(k, n) * C(k, m) for k = 1…n
O(Ef) where E is the number of edges, f is max flow. When orderfree and continuityfree are
both specified in the pattern, it is better to specify the max number of parameters in order to have
the algorithm be bounded, the same for matching the signatures in the first stage.
Figure 1 depicts an example system 100 according to an implementation of the present
disclosure. Figure 1 illustrates one example computing system that can be used to implement the
present disclosure. Other computing systems can be used as well. The system 100 may
comprise one or more user computing devices, such as user computing device 102, one or more
firewalls, such as firewall 130, one or more filtering server computing systems, such as filtering
server computing system 140, and one or more web servers, such as web server(s) 160, coupled
over one or more networks, such as network 180.
The user computing device 102 can include one or more processors 104 and a memory
106. The one or more processors 104 can be any suitable processing device and can be one
processor or a plurality of processors that are operatively connected. The memory 106 can
include one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage mediums, such as RAM, ROM,
EEPROM, EPROM, flash memory devices, magnetic disks, etc., and combinations thereof. The
memory 106 can store data 108 and instructions 110 which are executed by the processor 104 to
cause the first computing device 102 to perform operations.
The user computing device 102 can also include one or more input/output interface(s)
116. One or more input/output interface(s) 116 can include, for example, devices for receiving
information from or providing information to a user, such as a display device, touch screen,
touch pad, mouse, data entry keys, an audio output device such as one or more speakers, a
microphone, haptic feedback device, etc. The user computing device 102 can also include one or
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more communication/network interface(s) 118 used to communicate with one or more systems or
devices, including systems or devices that are remotely located from the user computing device
102.
According to an aspect of the present disclosure, the user computing device 102 can send
requests to and receive responses from one or more web servers, such as web server(s) 160. The
requests and responses can be processed through one or more firewalls, such as firewall 130, for
example, to protect the user computing device 102 from malicious actors. The firewall 130 can
communicate with filtering server computing system 140 to perform URL filtering as discussed
herein.
The filtering server computing device 140 can include one or more processors 142 and a
memory 144. The one or more processors 142 can be any suitable processing device and can be
one processor or a plurality of processors that are operatively connected. The memory 144 can
include one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage mediums, such as RAM, ROM,
EEPROM, EPROM, flash memory devices, magnetic disks, etc., and combinations thereof. The
memory 144 can store data 146 and instructions 148 which are executed by the processor 142 to
cause the filtering server computing device 140 to perform operations, for example, to
implement operations as discussed herein. The filtering server computing device 140 may
include one or more URL filtering systems 150 that can assist in identifying and/or filtering
invalid and/or malicious URL requests and/or responses. The URL filtering systems 150 can
include a bipartite matching subsystem 152 which can provide operations for malicious URL
filtering as discussed herein.
Figure 2 depicts a flowchart illustrating example operations 200 for inspecting of byte
streams using a bipartite match algorithm in accordance with aspects of the present disclosure.
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Although operations 200 are shown and described in a particular order for purposes of
illustration and discussion, the operations are not limited to the particularly illustrated order or
arrangement and certain operations can be performed in different orders or simultaneously.
The operations begin at block 202 where patterns are compiled into an n*m binary matrix
plus one additional column to describe the modifiers, where n is the number of patterns and m is
the number of unique tokens used in the patterns.
At block 204, the signatures are compiled into DFA as usual (e.g., partitioned per URL
host + path using a trie data structure) such that e(i,j)=1 if and only if the ith pattern has the jth
token.
At block 206, in the first stage of runtime, an n*m binary matrix is built where n is the
number of tokens matched against the DFA and m is the number of signatures such that
e(i,j)=true if and only if the ith token matches the jth token.
At block 208, in the second stage of runtime, the sub runtime n*m matrix is obtained for
a particular pattern such that e(i,j)=true if and only if the ith token matches the jth tokens in the
pattern.
At block 210, a bipartite graph is built having two sets of vertex, n and m, where n is
token and m is signature. There is a weight 1 edge between an ith vertex in n and an nth vertex
in m if e(i,j) in the matrix is true.
At block 212, indication(s) can be provided for malicious URL(s) that are identified such
that appropriate response measures can be performed.
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Abstract
The present disclosure describes systems and methods to enable inspecting of byte
streams using a bipartite match algorithm to detect use of evasive techniques to defeat Uniform
Resource (URL) filtering. According to an aspect of the present disclosure, a two stage dynamic
programming algorithm is provided that matches signatures once and only once just like DFA in
the first stage, and uses polynomial runtime to select a matching pattern in the second stage.
According to an example implementation of the present disclosure, the patterns are compiled into
an n*m binary matrix plus one additional column to describe the modifiers, where n is the
number of patterns and m is the number of unique signatures used in the patterns. In the first
stage of runtime, an n*m binary matrix is built where n is the number of tokens matched against
the DFA and m is the number of signatures such that e(i,j)=true if and only if the ith token
matches the jth signature. In the second stage of runtime, the sub runtime n*m matrix is obtained
for a particular pattern such that e(i,j)=true if and only if the ith token matches the jth signatures
in the pattern. A bipartite graph can be built where there are two sets of vertex, n and m, where n
is token and m is signature. There is a weight 1 edge between an ith vertex in n and an nth vertex
in m if e(i,j) in the matrix is true.
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